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the poor quality of its loan portfolio and its inability to
obtain auoitional funds either from domestic or foreign sources
in view of the present crisis. An analysis of the financial
status-of DBP is-indeed important. It iS a government-owned
aevelopment corporation heavily dependent on public funds. A
Study of Tan (1954) is very much relateo to thiS. But while her
study examines the role of DS_ in relation to the selective
c=eoit control policy of governmen£, this study analyzes the
financial status of DBP in _elation to the current financial
crisis.
Section I briefly reviews the ob]ectives of establlshing
DBP. The sources and uses of D_P_s funos are discussed in
Sectlon I._. The last section concludes the stuoy.
I. ObjeCtives of Establishing the DBP
The Ob3ectives of establishing . DBP ar_ ou£1ined in
_ha_ter I, Section i of its charter which states:
"To provide credit facilities for the rehabilitation
and develop:,_ent and expansion of agriculture and
industry, the reconstruction of property damaged by war
and the broadeDing and diversification of the national
ecor_o_y, and to _romote the establishment of _.rivate
Gevelop_ent banks in provinces an_ citiesp there is
hereby createu a body corporate to. be known as the
Development Sank of the pn1!ippines, ...'_
2Two observations can be gleaned from this statement. Fir6t,
the mandate given DBP is very broad. Second, it is reflective of
the •efforts of the authorities to use supply-leadlng financial
institutions to hasten the development process in the country,
In an underueveloped economy, making the supply-leading financial
institutions viable is indeed a real problem. But this problem
can be circumvented if these are "government financial
institutions, using government capital and perhaps receiving
direct government subsidies" (Patrick' I_o5). The creation of
government financial institutions, like DBP, is, of course,
premised on the belief that there are externalities and
indivisibilities in the capital market that cannot be exploited
by capital-starved, short-term-oriented private financial
institutions (see Tan, 19_4). but it is difficult if not
impossible to identifyprojects with externalities considering
the prohibitive costs incurred in obtaining information.
Unfortunately, DB_ does not engage itsel;f in conducting rigorous
studies to iaenkifypro_ects with externalities. Although
feasibility studies are ma_e on certain pro3ectsbefore loan
approval, the risks invoiveO are oftentimes not properly taken
into consideration. A .case in point is the. _-.,i:_IC pro3ect which
failed due partly to inaGequate assessment of the exchange risk
inwolved. This problem will be compounded further if DBP is made
to support pro3ects at the behest of ti_e government. Indeed,
•this :has been the case for several big pro3ects s_]ppo_ted by DBP.
•Unfortunately, the governmentusually does not look very closely
3at the viability of a certain pro)ect. Oftentimes, political
considerations weigh more heavily in determining which projects
to initiate. Indeed, the present failure of big pro3ects
supporteO by DBP at the behest of government has aoded more
problems than provi_eo solutions to existing underdevelopment
problems. This has unquestionably undetermined the very objectives
of establishing tE_e DBP.
If. Financial Status ef DBP
The analysis of the financial status of DEP covers the
per io_ I_-S3. This is the parti_uiar period when DBP' s
financial difficulties became _,ore evident,
DB_s •resources •we•re 9rowing3 at an average rate of 25.8
_ercent annually duz-in_ _ne period _Oer study, higher than the
2&,.u percent average an__al _rowtn rate for the entire banking
system fo_ the same _erio_a. As of ii_eceJ_.;ber1963, DBP's total
resources reached _54._u._ w,n_h were about 18 percent of the
total resources of t_e bankJ_l_,g system. Thus_, DBP_s presence in
the banking system i's in<_ee<_ significant, It is one of the
biggest financial institutions in the country, secon_i only to
PNB. Zut its phenomenal growth as will he shown below only isasks
the real probles_s it confronts.
4Ao Sources Of Funds
DBP's authorized capital is _SB which is fully
subscriDed by the government. As of December 1983, its
shareholder's equity amounted to _5.4B.
As Tan (1983) has pointeo out, DBP does very little
intermediation. This is unoerstandable since it is DBP's
policy to shy away from competing with private financial
institutions in raising deposits. Recently, it competed
with PNB in attracting deposits from government agencies and
corporations. Although quite successful in this endeavor,
DBP's Oeposit base is still considerably small compareo with
an ordinary private bank due to the resource constraints
facing government agencies and corporations. Between 195_
ano IS82, time an_ savings deposits co_npriseo only .about
one-fift_ of its total liabilities (see Table i).
Interestingly, their share markedly dropped from 18.4
percent in 19_2 to 9.5 percent of total liabilities in 1983_
This was due mainly to tne huge _,itn(_rawa]s made by the
National <_overnment, which _arently changeo its policy --
using its deposits rather than to borrowing more so as not
to increase further its huge external and oofnestic debts.
However, of the total amount withdrawn, _25 was placed back
by the government in the form of noD-interest bearing fixe_
deposits with a term of 25 years. This was recorded as
S_ecial-Funos-National Government _h_cn is not part of total
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Table 1
TOTAL LIABILITIES, DBP
Liability Items 19S3 1982 1981 198_
TCTAL LIABILITIES (ML) _7.5 38.7 3_.2 23._
Short term owings- ,:,orr
Foreiqn (%) 4.4 6,7 6.6 3.5
Do_:_estic (%} 2.3 1.6 0.6 1.3
LonO-ter_L _/orrowings_
_::et of Cu_r=_nt [-iaturities
Foreign (%) 35.U 29.7 25.2 27.4
Do,nest ic (%) 29.9 31.E 33.1 35.6
Time an¢ Savings Deposits (%) B.9 18.4 21.8 2_.8
Others (%) 13.7 12.6 12.7 12.2
$OL_RCF,S" : DBP Annual Reports, 158___-_3.
liabilitles nor of equity. This was a smart move on the
part of government since it avoided increasing equity
contribution to government corporations which had already
9one out of proportion in the previous years. This was a
welcome move for DBP sir_ce it effectively reduced its total
liabilities without _eces_arily affecting its total
resources. Also, it cii_ noC have to pay interest on such
aeposits.
Agid_ f_o_ _.q;,osit.<_,, D£-_-,_-also issu_,_ .its Countryside
:-;ills to raise mo_e fun<;s. But procee</_ t,£o_:_ tbis debt
instrument were ve_ 3- l.i,(:it=ed. As of December 1983,
only _...._ per',:_nt, oi- _,[$ tote! ij,_bilJties_
Since its mepo,_J,ts ancl orocee<_s .fro-.,',securities were
ve_,_, limited to sustain .its ambitious lending operat_.o,qs_
D£_P tu,r_e<J into borrowin:js. It re.lied ._ore on lon-_-te_m
borrc_,,iDgs ant less on shor[-term borrowings_ The for__e_-
comprised about tnree-fifth_ of its total liabilities during
the perioc uneer stu<,:_:. GovernmeL't guarantees of DBP_s
bobroofings ane multilateral loans coursed th):oug_1 DBP made
the reliance on iong--terf_ leans possible. It is wort_whiie
to note that over the yeazs, there _as a shift in securin9
lon(3-ter__ funos fro_;_ do_,,estic to the foreign so_rces. The
Inc[easing emp,qasis on foreign borrowings surely contributed
to the gzowing e×teznal debt problem of the country. AS o9
December 1983, DBP's outstanding short- and long-term
borrowings comprised 6.6 percent of total foreign exchange
liabilities of the Philippines, 24.5 percent of the. Sanking
Sector's outstanding external debts, and 9.1 percent of the
[-!on-_anking Sector' s outstanding external debts, Its
outstan_/J, ng !ong-term borrowings alone were I_.2 percent of
total out-standing f_xed-.tet_ eeb ....o._ tt_e country.
impcatant _r_i_i!ht.._ can also be gathered if we loom at
the cont.ribUtic[_ of v_rioa_ iostitutions to D£_P's resources.
Table 2 present_ t_ie institutional sources of DSP_s
borrowings in ciuoin_ de_f_o_J,tS_ As a gro.up, ADI_, the _orld
_a_iK an_ other private cred ito_:s wer.e ,;be largest
__/
cor_t_ib._tors to [_;_P's ___,,,_-<.__)o_rowi,_g_ The Central Sank
and t_e _-_atio_ai: Goveri-u_e_ _nd oti_er agei%cies were also
si9nifica._ cc_ntri_)utors to Di_,P_s resources. Interestingly,
the s_are of the [_ational Gove:cnment ant other agencies
consiste_.tiy de ci_neC over _: oet_oc 198_-_3 But this was
moze than offset b./ _: __. n_ Cer,tral _ank's co_.t_ibutions W_.icn
consistently iinc_eased during the same perio_. [_ote that
the phenomenal rise in the Central _ank's contributions in
1563 co inci_ed with the [_h_:_ dec:line in net le_ding by the
National Government te D8_; (_ee Table 3). Thus, although
Since D_P does not cO_:;pete w_th the private financial
institutions iP raising domestic funos, the "other private
creditors" refezreC to above must have been composed mainly of
foreign private creditors. }_ete that D_P is authorized to incur
obligations with or without governme6t guarantee.
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Table .2
SOURC.=:S OF BORNOWINGS, BY INSTITUTION, DBP*
(In Percent)
Institutional Source 1983 1982 1981 1980
Central Ba_k 33._ _o_. 21._ 18._
(•,ationa I <overnmen t •
and other Agencies 21.0 23._ 2[_._ 29._
SOC:{a]. Security Svstem (SSs) _.;_ _},_ i_.0 12._ 14._)
Asian Oeve!c:ment _:,_nk (A•D}_)
Worl<_ 6an_ ant: Prfvase
Credi to,rs 36, _ 41 ,_ 39. £: 39.
eInclu¢_es c:eposits.
*::SSS is re_,_u[_,ci by law tO _nvest 25 percent of its investible funds in
O_ bon_s,
SOURCES : D_:,_ Annual Reports, 198_-83.
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Table 3 '
NATIONAL GOVERNMENT'S NET .nE_DING TO DBP
(:n _)
'.. .. }.9_.4 1.9|_ 1,982 , 1981
[.Oar: Outle? .. +" " l_.4g 82.55 -
• . ..
Ac:vance:% .--_-OrSecu_.i-_.g .
•Gu_._&p._e_.d Loa_::.,, _ _77=_3 "_ 5f> 342 64
I_.=_:,ayc'_ei_t.c>_Adv_c,-cea .. _ 4_6._5 81.94 _3.35
t :,-.,t Ler_ii_._3 6,ZS&._ 26.88 (_¢I. iI 259..26
•_.}_zeakdc)_n _e not: av_.ilable.,
SOUF.CE : 5-_}mist,--.vof the ?.u_get.
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put more pressure on government budget deficits which the
9overnment is also trying to reduce, unless it can
substantially cut expenditures in other areas. It seems
therefore that DBP woulO have a very limited set of choices
for raising more funds. One possible alternative is to
allow DBP to issue more securities, but this migh_ be
unacceptable because it would just aggravate the crowding
out problem currently felt by the market with the p_esence
of hig_ yieloing C_ntral bank bills and treasury bills.
Anotne_ possible choice is to let DBP raise funds internally
by improving loan collections ann selling unprofitable
assets. 5ut everl this alternative is no_ very promising.
ThiS issue is Oealt with in t_e next section.
B. Oses of Funds
m
Table 4 presents the assets of D_P. Loans outstanding
comprised a little over one-half of its total assets, while
investments, about one-fifth. The shares of these two asset
items were relatively constant during the period 198_-83_
Although acquireo assets constit_ted a relatively small
proportion of total assets, the rise i_ their share was
conspicuous in 19_2 when D_P engaged itself most extensively
in foreclosing baa accounts.
A shift in the compositio_ of the loan portfolio of DBP
is noticeable. Outsta_Cin9 incustrial loans _umped tO _21B •
in 1563 from _I2D in the previous year, whereas outstanding
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T_ble 4
ASSETS, DBP
1983 1982 1981 198¢
TOTAL ASSETS (_B) 54.9 44._J 34.7 27.1
Investments (%) 2@.4 22.9 22.8 21.1
Loans (%) 56.3 52._ 53.3 53.7
Acquired Assets (%) 6.1 6.1 2.9 3.6
Other Resources (%) 17.2 19.b 21._ 21.6
r
SOU_CgS _ DEP Annual _eports, 198¢-83.
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agricultural loans slightly declined to _3B from _3.2B (see
Table 5). Also, the average amount of loans approved by DBP
for the agricultural sector slightly decreased to _._41M in
1983 from _g._47_ in i_2, while that for the industrial
sector markedly increased to _6.6M in 1983 from _2M in 1982.
The perceptible shift in the composition of DBP's loan
portfolio occurred at the time when a lot of big industrial
firms, some of which were financially supported by DBP, were
facing acute economic difficulties. It seems highly
probable, therefore, that a great proportion of the
adaitional industrial loans went to financially-strapped
firms at the expense of the agricultural sector. Although
DBP is given the manuate to extend loans for t_e
rehabilitation of ailing firms, such manaate could have been
used more selectively rather than auto_atically whenever
firms show some signs of financial difficulties.
An examination of the composition of DBP's investment
portfolio can further help in understanding its direction.
DBP is given the powers to invest in marketable securities
ana provide equity funas to private development banks and
key industrial firms. Investments in marketable securities
comprised 45 percent of total investments in 1980 (see
Table 6). But over the years, their share had been
Marketable securities are composed of treasury capital
bonds, treasury bonds, CBCIs and other government securities.
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Table 5
LOAN PORTFOLIO, DBP
(In _M)
1983 1982 1981 198_
,| ,, ,_ --
Agricultural Loans 2,_63.2 3,145.8 3,683.2 2.,766.9
Industrial Loans 21,@i_.% 12,_08.1 i_,438.8 7,768.2
Advances on Guaranteed Loans 1,472.7 1,674.4 425.1 2_4.7
Real Estate Loans 4,413.4 4,541.3 3,896.2 3,246.7
Government Loans 3%3.7 365.6 313.1 3_6.6
Advances- Private
Development Banks 473.5 443.9 349.% 252.8
•
or.e= Loa.s 523.2 e64.6 68.3 59,7
•,, Less Reserve for
Possible 5osses 24_.8 165,2 57'2 58,7
Net Loans 3G,919.7 22,8?5.4 18,516.5 14,546.8
• " r 1 _l i r- ._r - "
•[ ,, ri r- _
SOURCES : DBP Annual Relports_ 198g-83.
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Table 6
INVESTMENTS, DBP
1983 1982 1981 1980
Investments in Marketable
Securities (_M) 2,_12._ 2,168.g9 2,415._4 2,573.52
(!719) (21.5) (30.5) (45.8)
Equity Investments (_b_) 9_212_66 7,923.70 5,496.77 3,14_.85
(82.1) (78.5) (69.5) (55._)
Private Corporations _ 87.9 83.4 76.9 82.6
Commercial Banks* 6_8 18.7 15.2 4.5
Government Owned/
Controlled Corporations* 4._ 4.6 6.4 In.9
Private Development Banks* 1.3 1.3 1.5 2.0
T O T A L (_) 11,225.46 10,_92.7Z 7,911.81 5,714.37
*Percen[ of total equity investments.
$O[iRCES _ DBP Annual Reports, 198Z-@3.
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consistently declining. In 1983, investments in marketable
securities constitute_ only i7.9 percent of total
investments. In contrast, the share of equity investments
has been consistently increasing from 55 percent of total
investments in 198_ to 87.9 percent in 1983. This
development raises the question of whether D_P provided more
equity funds to new promising firms or to ailing firms. A
look at the partial list of companies with DbP equity shown
in Annex A seems to intricate that a significant proportion
of the increase in e_uity investments went to ailing
companies. For some fir;_s, like commercial banks, not
previously financially supported by DBP, new equity funds
were infused. But for other firms, like hotels and mining,
previously availing of DBP loan facility, maturing loans
were converted into e<_uity in order to obtain additional
loans from DBP. It shoulc_ be noted that it was DBP in the
first place, who encouraged these seemingly viable firms
with externalities by providing chea_ capital. Thus, by
extending more financial help to these firms, D_P hopes to
recoup some of its losses. But so far, all indications
_oint otherwise.
Equity investments that went to private corporations
had been increasing at the expense of com_:ercial banks,
government owned/controlle_ corporations and private
aevelopment banks. Interestingly, the snare of commercial
banks in DBP_S total e_uity investments was quite
17
significant, even greater thanthat of private development
banks. In Annex A, seven private commercial banks are shown
to have DBP equity, since the explici_ mandate of DBP is
"to promote the establishment of private development banks,,
its equity investments in commercial banks must have been
designed to ease the financial difficulties encounterea by
these banks.
Equity contributions by DBP to commercial banks were in
large lots (see Table 7). In i_83, two commercial banks
zeceived equity contributions of _267h, whereas four private
_evelopment banks and ten rural banks received only _12.9M
and _5.b_, respectively. I_hat is worth noting is that
after D_P provided a6aitional capital to ailing oommercial
banks, it turned tO the Central _ank for re_iscounting. As
DBP'S e{_uity exposures to ailing commercial banks got
larger, its outstanding advances from the Central Bank for
commercial banks capitalization also grew bigger as may be
gatherea from the follo_ing figures: 19_3 - _I.6B; 1982 -
_0.9_; 19_I - _.7D; and 195_ - _0.2B. So, in the final
analysis, it was the Central Eank which hel_ed financially
strappeO commercial banks, using DDP as a conduit. Indeed.
It is to be noted that aside from equity investments,
private development banks ana rural bani:s also receive advances
from DBP. A_)proved aavances in 1593 amounted to _158M.
J
The figure for 1583 includes regul_r reuiscounting which
unfortunately cannot be separated from reaiscounting for
commercial banks capitalization.
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Table 7
EQUITY INVESTMENTS APPROVED, DBP
(Amount = _M)
1983 1982 1981 1980
NO. Amount No. Amount No. Amount No. Amount
Banking
Rural Banks " 10 5.6 12 11.4 24 8.6 46 10.9
P_ivate Development
Banks 4 12.5 3 16.6 ii 32.8 15 2@.i
Commercial Banks 2 267.Z 2 153.8 4 57@.0 1 15.3
Industrial Real Estate
Firms 60 649.6 114 2,649.4 4_ 2,12_.3 30 1,121.8
_OT5 : In addition to equity investments, DBP also provided the following
advances to private development and rural banks: 1983 - _158.0M;
1982 - F22Z.2M; 1981 - FI_4.3M} 1988 - _ISI.IM.
SOURCES : DBP Annual RepOrts, 198[_-83.
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this has far reaching implications on the workings of the
financial system. First, inefficient commercial banks
facing financial aifficulties are rewarded by obtaining
equity contributions from DEP. This form of subsidy
compares well with directly obtaining emergency loans from
the Central Bank, which sometimes charges the market rate of
£/
interest. Moreover, e_uity investments do not have
maturity while loans from the Central Bank have. Clearly,
the inefficient banks helped by DBP were able to escape from
paying the onerous penalty. _econ_, DEP's participation in
rehabilitating ailing co_n_ercial banks undermines the
current policy of the Central Bank to consolidate banks
through mergers. Inefficient banks are not anymore
motivated to merge with tnore efficient banks since they
alreaay got support from DBP at a much lower cost. To the
extent that the Central Bank allows aavances to DBP for
co_nercial banks capitalization, it too is an accomplice in
undermining its very own policy. Actually, DBP had the
opportunity of helping the Central Bank pursue its policy
naa it use_ its exposures to the seven aillng commercial
banks as a lever to pull them together to forge a merger.
Finally, DBB's access to the Central Bank's rediscounting
facility at liberal discount rates exerts more pressure on
DHP pays the Central _ank only 4 to 9.5 percent annually
for aavances from Central Bank for commercial banks
capitalization.
!/
money supply. This problem could have been accentuateO
when the funds borrowe_ from the Central Bank were used to
Support inefficient commercial banks. In view of DBP's
preoccupation with other ma3or loan accounts, the task of
rehabilitating co,_.mercial banks could perhaps be done better
by the Central Lank. _fter all, it is the lender of last
resort. Allowing DDP to rehabilitate ailing banks is
desirable only if it uses its own excess funds so that no
new Honey will be created by the Central Bank.
Another aspect of DEP's Operation iS that of providing
guarantees to companies which otherwise cannot obtain loans
either from the domestic or foreign market. As of December
1963, total outstanding loan guarantees (both foreign
currency and peso dominated) amounted to _I5B, 94.3 percent
of which were foreign currency denominated (see Table 6).
Since F.rivate firms given guarantees coulu not repay their
maturing obligations, D}SP nau to Dear the b_rden of paying
these obligations. Thus, in 1982 when a lot of firms failed
to pay their maturing obligations, advances on guaranteed
loans 3umped four-fold to _1.7i5 and remained high at _I.BE
in 1983 (see Table 5). This inevitably added L_ore pressure
on the country's external eebts since almost all of the
guara|_teed loans were foreign currency denominated.
.....!/ ...
This issue is relate_ to the one discussec_ in Section IV
of the StUdy: "A Review anG A_raisal of the Government Response
.,, |!t0_tne i_3-_4 Balance-of-payments Crisis, PIDS (forthcoming).
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Table 8
GUARANTEES OUTSTANDING, DBP
__ _ _ 4 _
1983 1982 1981 1980
TOTAL (_._) 15,97_ 8,_45 5,21_ 3.605
Foreign Guarantees (US$_) 1,076 847 629 467
Domestic Guarantees (_M) 904 275 56 55
NOTE : Exchange rate used are: 1983 - _14.0_2 to $1.00; 1982 -
_9.171 to $1.0@; 1981 - 98.2@ to $1.0@; and 1980 - _7.6_
to $I._.
SOUkCES : DBP Annual Reports, !98M-83.
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As DBF was oragged deeper into the thicket of non-
viable an_ inefficient firms, it too encountereo its own
financial Qifficulties. Its loans and guarantee repayments
were slow and hard to come by. In fact, they weregetting
worse over the years. In 198_, the ratio of loan and
guarantee repayments to the total loans outstanding already
stoou at a low level of 16.64 percent, it went down further
to 12.45 percent in 1561, then 11.15 percent in 1982, and
finally to only _.67 percent in I_3. Clearly, DDP was
harLly able to generate funus internally due to the bad
quality of its loan portfolio. Perha@s, the availability of
budgetary supvort, Central Lank su_;port and foreign
borrowings _ade D_P less serious in generating funds
internally. _<ith the ca_ on Central Bank and foreign
borrowings, anu _ith the desire of the government to curb
its buuget _eficits, DEP eventually must learn how to
generate funds internally rather than aepend on external
sources, since loan and guarantee repayments come in
trickles, Qernaps they can be used to finance small ano
_aediu_ scale pro3ects with shorter gestation period so that
greater turnover of linited funds can be assured. This, of
course, re,_uires a raaical shift in D_P'S lending policy.
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III. Concluding Remarks
The study: "A Review and Appraisal of Government Response
to the 1_83-54 BOP Crisis" (forthcoming) reviews the performance
of the economy for the past few years. It is observed that the
savings-investment gap and budget deficits have been increasing_
DBP's contribution to these problems is quite discernible, as it
_iG very little intermediation ano instead, relied heavily on
external borrowings, Central Bank support and budgetary support.
Although, OEP's giving of equity contriDution ano granting of
loans and loan guarantees at very generous rates to certain firms
believed to have some externalities haO contributeo to the
acceleration of investment in the country, this did not
necessarily contribute positively to the Oevelo_i_ent process.
Experience shows that a significant number of D_P-supported firms
run into financial trouble°
The attendant economic •crisis _ic_ in a way DBP nelpeo
create has a&versely affected D_P in four _vays. First, it gives
DSP more difficulty in raising funds internally. Its loans a_d
guarantee repayments are at their lowest levels because their
clients are facing acute economic problems. _oreover acquired
assets cannot be ais_ose_ of as fast as DB_ wants tO because of
the _eneral slo_,down of the economy. _ut even without the
present economic crisis_ there were alreacy strong inoications
that the quality of DbP's loan portfolio woulc: deteriorate
consioerin 9 the kinds of project it supported even before the
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onset of the cris_s. SeconO, DSP's access to the external
sources of funds is greatly impaired because of the current
restriction on foreign borrowings. Third, Central Bank's support
cannot • be expecteo anymore since the growth Qf reserve money is
curbed. And finally_ buogetary soFport will be difficult to
obtain in the future since government aims to drastically reduce
the budget Qefic_t,. ut_iess it gives top _riori_y to DBPo
.The <._estion non is: _<nere wou___c D_P cjo fro,_ _ere? T.he[e
are at least, three aiternat_..ves fro,?, which] DLP can choose.
First, it can ado_,t a %_ai._ " :"-anu-•_ee attituee u_til the economic
con_itions turn bet._er. Perhei,_-s_ a certain orogram t_lat does no_:
necessaril_ require a restr_;ctu_:ing of its _._o!icy of lending a._d
raising funds can be im[Jla.,_,ente_ while tt_e econo,_}, is still _
bau sha_e. The ze_abiii, tahion _<ia_ of DLP effec<e_ last January
i_4 _hicn st i_ulate_ tn_t u.,%., fund in:_5 responslbilitie3
eorrest_on&ing to ....._ _ non_.e_fo_:inQ accounts_, as well a& accoant_
which DBP fundec at -_Le_Denest of Government ant: _ts Bqenci_-__
.... _ is in line _ 'will be assumec by tDe _atioDal _c,verna%ent_ .o. _,_t_
trois _.ost,_re. _J.'his, of course, is !:[emised on the belief that
the crisis causee D}..P'_._ financ.ial difficulties. Eut as pointec_
out earlier, the p[esept economic crisis merely exposes. D_JP_s
weaknesses. Hence, a retu_ to r_ormal economic conoitior_ will
.-,or guarantee an auto__atic lmf_,rovement of D}SP's financial status
unless the _eaknesses are _irst cor_ecteu.
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The second alternative is. perhaps• more compelling. Tt
s_ggests going Qirectly to the heart of DSP's weaknesses. As
_iscussed above, its weaknesses lie in the poor quality of its
loan portfolio an_ the manner by w_,ich it sources funds. It is,
therefore, necessary to ioo_ i_to tile criteria usee by D}3P iD
a_rOVing IQans to fine out p¢,s_imle _reas of i_n_,zovement. For a
•._ucce:_sfu•! iendin9 _._.oq4_:am_ ao_,=uate info_._at..ior_ is necessary so
as to _istinguis_% v._ble _._:oj_.ct_ _,_itn externalities. This in a
way will deter <_4ove_::._._ntf[oi_ _._:essu[ing D:_P-to support favorea
p_o]ect_ of deubtf'al viability, l._oreover,. DL?_s ,nandate te
zei'_bilitate aii in_ fir__:_{., esi?eciall.y if it r_..u_e_ additional
C_.'_<c¢_J..:[:a;3}<-_u!--_.orts_ou,_ be exerciseu morenocwetary_ _nc_ ......."
-:i_'_iectJ.vei_ratne_ _"_,_a_auto__a_.icaily_ wbeneve;:, certain fires show
se_:ie si_gns of finar_ciai G!ff_culties. The ulti_nate aim is fo.c
[)_ to im_,rove ¢.h_ <uaiity <_ its lean .[2oztfeiio that would
assu_e it of a co_t:iDuous infiow of funGs generated interna_iy.
V_gorous effer_s _._st 19e exalted to. sell ac_/ui _e_ asset_.
Acquire:L assets _T_-ust be so l.u tO the- private sector_ not to
anoth£): gover:_ment corporation, like UDC, _n& th_: sale must be
generate_ I_ara cash .for DLF _, c,ot long-tar m /zomissory no,re.
DdP's sa_e of _nt.erba_k to _¢DC _itn the is_ce., issuing long-term
_romisso_y n,ote a_ {:ay.:nent is certain_y not in line with tt_s-
view. _nstea.u, it cefeats the pur_-ose of •selling ac.-_uired asse£_
to raise fur,ds. i:oreover, i_ does not free the government of
un_ante¢_ assets. _._tb re_,ar:_ to borrowings, t_e use of bt_dgetaT:y
support _;ay be mini_,%izeu so aS not to compro_uise its operatien
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with the wishes of the party in power. In addition, raising
funds through savings mobilization rather than through Central
Bank and foreign borrowings should be cons iderea seriously. . All
these, of course,, re(_ulre a radical restructuring of DBP's policy
of lending and raising func_s.
•The •third alternative is _nat of closlng DB_. This
possibility deserves a _erious look. I_ has been noted tnat
DBP_s leason for _._-_xisteBce is ma-ae unclear with the •absence of
aoe_uate i_fo_nstion about viable pro_ects witB externalities.
_loreover_ the fi_anciai ciJffic:ulty _hich it is expeY, iencing now
aria t_e p_ee_.c_ment of se_era_ • big, Di_P-._u_.oi:Led firms are
_ "_ t _.tindJ.ca_,o_ t_a: hai_ z_.c)_be_[_ successf_i .i._,carlying out its
oD3ectives despite massive C-ent_al Sank and government support.
indeed_ its f_il_re I:,a$ a p_-ofound effect cn the entire economy.
[_y granting guarantees aD6 •loaDs at very ge[_ecous rates to a lot
of big non-viable firn_s, _n_ b,/ exte_ding financial i]elp to a
number •of inefficient first,s, DSP has create_ more market
distortions instead of correcti, ng existir,_g ones.
The last alternative must, no,ever, be examineo more
carefully. The _ro_le_ of pbs_in% out DS_' _,ay be more complex
than what it appears to be. Also, its effects on the different
sectors of the economy, especially one financial system_ neec: to
be %uantified. Perhaps, future research stucly can deal with th_s
issue mor_ extensively.
Annex A
PARTIAL LIST OF COMPANIES WITH DBP EQUITY •
•. Exposure
•" Firms Amount (_M) _ of T6tal
•...................... _ .... E:gui y__
A. F inancia_l Institutions
I, A ssoc_ated Bank 212.(_ 30.0
2. Znterna_ional Corporate Bank * 88.0
3. Merchants investment Corp. 4Q._ 35.8
4. PCIB * 30.0
5. Pilipinas Sank 280.0 6.0
6. PZSO Deveiopmenr. _-%ank 50.0 *
7. P;:oducer s Bank 10,_ 7.6
• ._=_._;b_ic Pl_nters Bank 36.._ 3.2
9. Tra_ers Royal B_Lnk *
16o_ Urban De_[elopment fSank * *
B. _{ostei r_
i
Ii, Hotel t-_i[ado_ ._ 48.0
12. _ani]a _r_(_riP, hotel, In(:. _ 49.9 :
13, _!aniia Peninsula i{etel 163.r, 68.4
14. :Xi_rana,_ i!onels _n</ Resort
Co_'p o /. 13.8 54.2
!
15.. Phiii_pine l:_OteJ,ie_[_ Znc. .!2_5.£_ 6'7.8
, 16. _esort Hotels Co_p. * 54.0 ,
17. Silan_s internatio;_al
Hotel, IrJc. __0!-(_ 42.0
t
18 Ma_,,ila Mandarin Hc_cl 56 0 *
; 19. _entur_ P_rk Sheraton 180_ *
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-- v =1 \ t .....
Exposuze
Firms Amount ' (_M) % -of T'otaf
C. Tex t i!e•_Manufac•tur inn
2_. Alfa •Integrated Textile Mills 241.0 l_O.g
21. Continental Manufacturing Corp. I09.(_ I(_0.O
22. nakeview Industrial Corp. • 95.47
23_ Redson Textile Bnd
Manufacturing Corp. * IM(_.0
24. Solid/ Mills, Inc. 66.fa 10E)._
25. Synthetic Textile
Manufacturing Corp. * i@@.0
25: L,:_: _'e._ti 1_.:,_ __. 2z3._. ,_._:_
.:27. Riverside Mills Corp. 213.Q *
28. .Textfiber Corp. 2_J8,_ ,
D. P_er., and .Pu__l_p Manufacturi_
29. Isarog PUI_ and Paper Co. * I_.0
3_. Faper Industries Cor_,oraxion
of the Philippines 388._ 16.83
3!:. Paragon Paper industries, i_c. 40g.(_ !0_._
E. Mining
32. B atong Buhay Mining C'orp_ * 24.8
33. _iarinduque _4ining ac,_
Industrial Corp. 1_98._ 19._8
34. Sabena V_ining Corp. * 17.0
35. __ester n Minolco , ,
F. Cemeyt ..
3_. :;}l.CianO C_':,:__r_*z CC.k'._.._ ,.
AII_ e.$ ¢ I[/
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• Exposure
Firms Amount (YM) % of Total
..... .. L _, , Equity
• • 4 •
37. Pacific Cement Co., Inc. * 32.2
G. Other s
38. CDCP 744.94 13.8
39. DBP Management Co. 2.5 I_0._)
4_. PLDT * 22.0
41. Philippine Blooming Miiis I,i_)_._ *
42. DBP Data Center 1.25 i_.9
43. Hotel Develop_,_ent Corp. 2._ I_)8.0
_: .. _. _:=.- .....................
*Data are not available.
SOURCE : R,.G. _anasan, Pub kit Enterprise in the,Philippines in
i982: A Definitional _nd_x0nomical E)(_icise, = P!OS"
Staff Paper Series _o. 84-g_.
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